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reversal of the defendant's robbery conviction since there was
proper identification at trial by five eyewitnesses to the crime. 2 18
Wortzman v. Kaladjian 2 19
(decided October 20, 1994)

Petitioner claimed that respondent's method of calculation used
to determine petitioner's eligibility for medical assistance violated
his right to due process and equal protection as guaranteed by
both the New York State 2 0 and Federal22 1 Constitutions. 222
Petitioner alleged that the method of calculation was arbitrary and
22 3
capricious and sought relief through an article 78 proceeding.
Petitioner requested a declaration that the respondent had violated
his constitutional rights. 224 Furthermore, petitioner sought an
order directing respondent to retroactively recalculate his
eligibility "based on his actual expenses and an allocation of a

personal needs allowance." 22 5 Although the Appellate Division,
218. Id. at 252, 423 N.E.2d at 384, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
219. 617 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994).
220. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id.; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 11. This provision provides: "No person shall be deprived the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." Id.
221. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision provides: "No state
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. This provision provides: "No
state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws." Id.
222. Wortzman, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
223. Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law & Rules § 7803, provides for
judicial review of respondent's determination of the issue raised in the
proceeding to consider "whether a determination was made in violation of
lawful proedure ... or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
discretion .... "N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 7803(3) (McKinney 1993).
224. WorMa, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
225. Id. at 467. Petitioner contended that eligibility should be
based upon a computation of his net income which treats as surplus
income available to meet medical expenses only Petitioner's net income
after deduction of the payment actually made to the adult care facility in
each month and the personal allowance provided in that month under
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First Department did not explicitly address petitioner's
constitutional claims, the court held that the calculations
"accorded disparate treatment to the medical needs of the
categorically needy and medically needy." 2 26 The matter was

227
remitted to the respondent for reconsideration.
Petitioner, Leo Wortzman, is a psychiatrically disabled veteran,
qualified as "medically needy," 22 8 residing at an adult home
licensed and regulated by the New York State Department of
Social Services [hereinafter DSS]. 22 9 Petitioner's application for
medical assistance was denied by the New York City Human
Resources Administration [hereinafter HRA] until he had
incurred $113 in medical expenses. 2 30 This amount, representing

Social Services Law § 131-o to SSI [Supplemental Security Income]
recipients residing in health care facilities.
Id.
226. Id. at 469.
227. Id. at 467. However, the Appellate Division, First Department
modified the order and judgment of the Supreme Court to vacate the directions
to respondent requiring that the respondent consider actual expenses in
determining eligibility. The court held that there was no statutory authorization
for such a requirement and that consideration of such expenses may present
new comparability difficulties. Id at 469-70.
228. Id. at 468. "Medically needy" individuals may qualify for medical
assistance if they incur medical expenses that reduce their available income to
the eligibility level. Id. at 467-68. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 366
(McKinney 1992). A person is "medically needy" if his income is not enough
to cover his medical expenses but too high to qualify for Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) which would categorize the individual as "categorically
needy." Wortznan, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 468. The difference between the
eligibility level and the net income is known as "excess income." Id. When a
"medically needy" person applies for medical assistance, the DSS measures his
net income against an established medically needy income standard. Id. "New
York regulations provide for a medically needy income standard equal to either
the 'medical assistance standard' or the 'public assistance standard of need.'
whichever is greater. Net income is derived from gross income by deducting
exempt income and allowable deductions." Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a[aI[10][CI[i] (1989); 42 C.F.R. § 435.812 (1993); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 366.2[a] (McKinney 1992); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 352.8[b][3], [c][1][ii], § 360-4.7[b][1] (1962).
229. Worzman, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
230. Id. at 617 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
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the difference between the petitioner's gross income adjusted by
insurance premiums and a predetermined standard of need value,
constituted excess income. 2 31 Petitioner was granted a hearing by
the DSS to challenge the calculations on the contention that the
$800 monthly rent that he paid in early 1990 and the $850
monthly rent paid after August 1, 1990 were not properly taken
into account. 232 Consequently, petitioner alleged that his actual
financial condition was not properly reflected. 233 Moreover,
petitioner contended that, as a "medically needy" person, he was
entitled to the same personal needs allowance that a
"categorically needy" person is statutorily guaranteed. 2 34 The
petitioner stated that the $113 "spend down" amount from his
income deprived him of additional funds to tend to his personal
needs. 2 35 However, after its deliberation, DSS determined that

236
the calculations were correct.

The court concluded that "[tihe computations employed by the
respondents require the petitioner to spend his income on medical
care to a level below the amount of the personal needs allowance
The $113 excess income figure... was arrived at by deducting a $20
Medicare premium and health insurance premiums of $28.60 in 1990
and $29.90 in 1991, from his gross income, which consisted of his
disability benefits [including Social Security Disability and Veterans
Disability benefits]. In 1990, these benefits totaled $982.60 and in
1991, they totaled $1004.90 per month. From this net income of $934 a
month in 1990 and $955 a month in 1991, was deducted a "public
assistance standard of need," which, in July of 1990, was $821 and in
July of 1991, was $842.
Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. A personal needs allowance is "set aside" from a categorically
needy person's fixed income. Id. at 469. This can neither be attached by the
facility where the individual resides, nor can it be relinquished to the facility
by the individual. Id. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW §§ 131-[1],[2], 461-e[4]
(McKinney 1992). "As of January 1, 1991, the monthly personal allowance
was 'at least $90.' In 1990, by contrast, the respondent's calculations left the
[petitioner] with $21 for personal needs. In 1991, the amount was eight dollars
short." Id. (citation omitted).
235. Wortzman, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
236. Id.
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which categorically needy recipients are permitted to retain
before he is eligible for medical assistance. "' 237 The court
reasoned that this was a more restrictive eligibility requirement
for "medically needy" individuals than for "categorically needy"
persons 23 8 and therefore, petitioner was entitled to have his
eligibility requirements re-calculated. 23 9
The court was able to reach its decision without expressly
addressing petitioner's constitutional claims. This was due to the
fact that federal statutes, as well as federal case law, provide that
"[c]omparable treatment must be accorded categorically needy
and medically needy medical assistance recipients." 24 0 In Calkins
v. Blum, 24 1 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York held that comparable treatment of
"medically needy" and "categorically needy" persons is
mandated by statutory and judicial authority. 242 The plain
language of section 1396 of the Social Security Act243 states that
the determination of medical assistance is to be "determined in
accordance with comparable standards." 2 44 Furthermore, judicial
interpretation has concluded that this provision requires that states
prescribe standards "for medically needy persons that are no
more restrictive than those standards governing the eligibility of
categorically needy persons." 245

237. Id. at 469.
238. Id.

239. Id. at 470.
240. Id. at 469. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A), (C).
241. 511 F. Supp. 1073 (N.D. N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 675 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1982). In Calkins, after plaintiffs had applied for assistance as medically needy
persons, they instituted an action for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary
relief by alleging that the eligibility for medically needy persons was
determined in a manner different from, and less generous than, the manner
used for categorically needy persons. Id. at 1079. Plaintiffs alleged inter alia
that such treatment violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
242. Id. at 1092.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a)(10)(C)(i) (1970).
244. Calkins, 511 F. Supp. at 1090-91.
245. Id. (citing Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 909 (1981)).
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Other courts have addressed claims by welfare recipients
holding that classifications for purposes of eligibility calculations
are violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 246 The New York
Court of Appeals rejected such a claim in Bernstein v. Toia.24 7
While this case did not deal specifically with the classifications of
"medically needy" and "categorically needy," 248 the court held

that if there is a rational basis for the legislation, and there is no
claim of invidious discrimination, then there are no constitutional
claims for violation of equal protection or due process. 24 9 The
Bernstein court noted that the rise of public assistance has become
a matter "of primary social and economic concern to the people
of the state of New York"2 50 and these concerns can provide a
rational basis for classifying people for purposes of distributing
246. See Daniels v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding a
Georgia intestacy statute, requiring that an illegitimate child establish paternity
during fathers lifetime in order to be eligible for survivors benefits under the
Social Security Act, to be violative of equal protection, since the child was
only two and one-half years old at the time of his putative father's death);
Medora v. Colautti, 602 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1979) (denying benefits based on

SSI guidelines in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). But see Dumaguin
v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 28 F.3d 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(holding that section of the Social Security Act imposing additional residency
requirements on adopted individuals beyond those otherwise applicable to alien
dependents and survivors seeking benefits is not violative of equal protection

rights); Miernicki v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 20 F.3d 354 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding the application of a statute governing railroad retirement annuities to

deny railroad employee years of service credit for months not worked due to
injuries which were compensated under the Longshore and Harbor Woriker's
Compensation Act, did not deny equal protection); Douglas v. Babcock, 990

F.2d 875 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993) (holding denial of
pregnancy-related Medicare Benefits to mother who previously failed to
cooperate in protection because government could rationally argue that
compelling low-income pregnant women to participate in establishing paternity
would make more funds available for all other recipients of Medicare).
247. 43 N.Y.2d 437, 373 N.E.2d 238, 402 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1977).
248. In Bernstein, a DSS regulation that fixed maximum shelter allovances
for recipients of public assistance but did not take into account circumstances
peculiar to individual recipients was being challenged. Id. at 440, 373 N.E.2d
at 239, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
249. Id. at 446, 373 N.E.2d at 243, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
250. Id. at 444, 373 N.E.2d at 242, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
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welfare benefits. 25 1 Although the court found that different
classes of people were being treated differently, the court held

that such treatment was "[m]otivated to make optimum
responsible use of the not unlimited funds appropriated and likely
to be appropriated for social services."252 Therefore, the court
2 53
found no constitutional violation.
The Bernstein court relied in part on the Supreme Court case of
Dandridge v. Williams.2 54 Dandridge involved an equal
protection claim in the area of welfare benefits. 255 The action
was based on a claim that a regulation resulted in disparity of
welfare payments. 2 56 The court announced that:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the
classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality. "257

When dealing in the area of social welfare, the regulation will be
upheld so long as the state action is "rationally based and free
from invidious discrimination.'258
251. Id. at 445, 373 N.E.2d at 242, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
252. Id. at 446, 373 N.E.2d at 242, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
253. Id. at 446, 373 N.E.2d at 243, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
254. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
255. Petitioners in Dandridge challenged provisions of the Federal Aid to
Families With Dependent Children under the laws of the State of Maryland.
Id. at 473. This program was designed to provide eligible families with the full
amount of their computed standard of need. However, the provisions provided
for an upper limit on the total amount of assistance that any one family could
receive. Id. Petitioners had large families and their computed standard of need
was higher than this ceiling amount. Id. at 474-75. They argued that this, in
effect, discriminated against them on the basis of the size of their family in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
475.
256. Id. at 484.
257. Id. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78 (1911)).
258. Id. at 487.
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Several years after Dandridgewas decided, the Supreme Court
was faced with the constitutional question that was posited to the
court in Wortzrnan - whether the classification of "medically
needy" and "categorically needy" for purposes of Medicaid
benefits, violates the Equal Protection Clause. 2 59 The purpose of
the classification, the court reasoned, was to determine who was
the most impoverished and who was often least able to overcome
the effects of their poverty. 260 The court held that "a decision to
allocate medical assistance benefits only to the poor does not
itself violate constitutional prihciples of equality; in terms of their
ability to provide essential medical services, the wealthy and the
poor are not similarly situated. .. "261 The court further stated
that, "[i]t is clear that a decision to allocate scarce assistance
benefits on the basis of an assumption that persons with greater
incomes generally .are better able to prepare for future medical
needs is not inconsistent with constitutional principles of equal
treatment." 262 Applying the "rational basis" test enunciated in
Dandridge, the Court found that there was a rational basis to
define need based on income "even though some persons with
greater income - who Have been unable or unwilling to save
enough of their earnings to prepare for future medical needs may actually be in greater need of assistance than those with less
6
gross income.2'2 3
In conclusion, although it was not specifically addressed in
Wortzman, the federal and state constitutional analysis on this
issue is virtually identical. When the challenged legislation is in
259. Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 583 (1982). Appellees originally
challenged the validity of the Social Security Act claiming it violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. As the Act was applied in
Massachusetts, appellees were ineligible for SSI or supplemental state

payments because they were currently receiving Social Security Benefits. Id.
260. Id. at 589.
261. Id. at 590.
262. Id. at 591.
263. Id. In dicta, the court argued that this equal protection argument was
really self-defeating. Id. at 592. "The injury that they regard as inconsistent
with constitutional principles of equal treatment could be avoided by denying
them all Medicaid benefits, thus placing them in a worse position financially
than they are in now." Id.
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the area of economic and social welfare, the courts will uphold
the statute in the face of an equal protection claim so long as
there is a rational basis for the classification. Allocation of scarce
resources is a major concern for the state. "[For the] people
[who] are the most needy in the country... it is appropriate for
medical care costs to be met, first, for [those] people." 2 64
SUPREME COURT
ALBANY COUNTY
Augat v. Dowling 265
(decided May 20, 1994)
Petitioner, Robert Augat, claimed the conduct of respondent,
Commissioner of Social Services of the State of New York,
violated his liberty interest in reputation and employment, as well
as his constitutional right to due process under the New York 266
and Federal Constitution. 2 67 Specifically, petitioner claims that a
report was issued citing allegations of physical abuse by the
petitioner against a resident, and directing the revocation of his
approval to act as administrator for the Laurel Manor Home for
Adults. 26 8 Further, the petitioner was discharged from his
employment, denied an opportunity to challenge the accusations
against him, and was not permitted to be present at the home or
264. Schweiker, 457 U.S. at 590.

265. 161 Misc. 2d 225, 613 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1994).
266. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
267. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1
provides in pertinent part: "No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. . .. " Id.
268. Augat, 161 Misc. 2d at 226-27, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 528. Mrs. Agatha
Augat also claimed respondent's conduct violated her constitutional rights. Id.
at 226, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
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